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NOTES AND COMMEN78
The llegitimate Child v. The State of North Carolina: Is There a
Justiciable Controversy under the New Constitutional Standards?
A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to
his tenth generation shall he not enter into the congregation of the
Lord. DEUTERONOMY 23.2
The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that
motley crowd of disreputable social types which society has generally
resented, always endured. He is a living symbol of social irregularity,
and undeniable evidence of contramoral forces, in short, a prob-
blem-a problem as old and unsolved as human existance itself.'
That discrimination based on illegitimacy pervades American law is
a universally known fact. This discrimination is derived from a tradi-
tion of prejudice which adversely affects a large -and growing class of
persons.' Until recently, however, discrimination based on status of
birth largely escaped constitutional review.
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE ILLEGITIMATE CmD
The cases of Levy v. Louisiana3 and Glona v. American Guarantee
& Liability Insurance Co.4 have resulted in a re-examination of this dis-
crimination; at least insofar as laws relating to status of birth are con-
cerned. Both Levy and Glona were cases involving the right to re-
covery for wrongful death under Louisiana's wrongful death statute. In
Levy the illegitimate child was attempting to recover for the death of
its mother. In Glona the mother was attempting to recover for the
death of her child. The Court held that the statute denied equal pro-
tection of the law to both illegitimate children, Levy, and the mother
of illegitimate children, Glona. The opinions in these cases generally
condemn classifications based on illegitimacy. The exact basis of the
Court's decisions, however, is less clear. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing
1. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 215 (1939)
quoted in H. KRAusE, ILLEGrrimAcY: LAW AiD SOcA PoucY 1 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as KRAus]. Note, however, that the classification "bastard," unlike the classifica-
tions "prostitute," "thief" and "beggar," is one completely void of volition.
2. In 1950, the rate of illegitimacy in the United States was approximately one out
of every 25 births. By 1960, one in 19, by 1964, one in 15, and by 1967, one in 12.
It is expected that the rate will reach ten per cent of all births before the end of this
decade. U.S. DEPARTMENT Op COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AD-
mAcr oF THE UNmTED STATES 48, 50 (1969). See KRAuSE, supra note 1 at 8.
3. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
4. $91 U.& 73 (1968).
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for the majority, announced in the Levy opinion that "it is invidious
to discriminate against illegitimate children when no action, conduct,
or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done
the mother."' 5 This statement incorporates language used by the Court
in deciding cases on the basis of the "rational basis" test of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses and implicitly the "fundamental
right" and "suspect classification" test of the Equal Protection Clause.
Use of the due process theory which precludes a state from denying per-
sons rights on the basis of a condition over which they have no control is
also not precluded by the language used by Justice Douglas.6 Earlier
in the opinion a discussion of the historical application of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to social and economic legislation coupled with the
Court's recent sensitivity to areas touching basic civil rights leads one
to conclude that the easier equal protection rational basis test was the
vehicle upon which the case was decided. It seems to this writer, how-
ever, that under any test, the statute in question in Levy and Glona
would have failed to meet the rational basis required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is perhaps borne out by the Court's reply in Glona
to the State's argument that the statutory scheme which discriminates
against illegitimates is designed to discourage extra-marital sexual activ-
ity. "We see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would indeed, be far-
fetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they
can be compensated in damages for their death." 7
The Court's broad approach in both Levy and Glona gave the cause
for equality under the law for illegitimate children a tremendous boost.
It has been argued by notable legal commentators in this area that these
two decisions supplied the necessary power for the courts to strike down
any legal distinctions which tended to discriminate between legitimate
and illegitimate children and impetus to state legislatures to take heed
with legislative change.8
Such hopes were dealt a severe blow, however, when in the 1971
case of Labine v. Vincent9 the Court, in a five-to-four decision, refused
to extend Levy to include Louisiana's intestate succession statutes
which prohibited unacknowledged illegitimate children from taking un-
der the statutes. The majority in a rather brief opinion (considering
5. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 72.
6. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
7. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. at 75.
8. See Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v.
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1969); KRAUSE at 59-84.
9. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
the Court's decision in Levy), written by Mr. Justice Black, concluded
that "the power to make rules to establish, protect; and strengthen
family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in Louis-
iana by a man dying there is committed by the U.S. Constitution and
the people of that state to the legislature of that state."'" The Court
distinguishes Levy by characterizing the "burden" faced by the children
there as insurmountable while in this case, the child could have in-
herited from her father either by will or intestate. (Louisiana's inte-
state succession laws provide that an unacknowledged illegitimate child
would take before the property escheated to the state i.e., if there were
no surviving legitimate children, parents, or collaterals.) Mr. Justice
Brennan writing for the four dissenters berated the majority, both for
its failure to recognize that the Equal Protection Clause requires a justi-
fication for Louisiana's discrimination against illegitimate children and
for what he considered its fallacious basis for distinguishing Levy. In
an exhaustive analysis of every interest offered by Louisiana in the face
of the Equal Protection Clause, he concluded that the statute fails to
satisfy even the rational basis test."
The decision in Labine left the constitutional rights of illegitimate
children in a state of limbo. The Court in Labine did not overrule
Levy, but the two decisions are hardly consistent. In 1972, the Court
received another opportunity to consider the rights of illegitimate chil-
dren, this time in a case involving Louisiana's workmen's compensation
statutes.'2 The statute relegated unacknowledged illegitimate children
of the deceased to a lesser status with respect to benefits than that oc-
cupied by legiimate children of the deceased. Mr. Justice Powell writ-
ing for seven justices, declared the law invalid under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. He identified the essential inquiry in cases involving an
equal protection challenge as a dual one. What legitimate state interest
does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger? After carefully considering each of
the proffered state interests (protecting legitimate family relationships;
facilitating potentially difficult problems of proof; statutory distinctions
reflect what might be presumed to have been the deceased's preference
of beneficiaries), he rejected all, concluding that the "inferior classi-
fication of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bears, in this in-
stance, no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of re-
covery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably serve."'13
The Court, however, did not overrule its decision in Labine. Rather,
10. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 535.
11. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 551-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
13. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. at 175.
209
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that case was distinguished on the basis that the state's interest there
was "substantial."' 14
Since Weber, the Supreme Court has not labored long in deciding
those cases that have reached it in favor of equality for the illegitimate
child. Noteworthy are Gomez v. Perez,15 New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill,'" Davis v. Richardson,17 and Griffin v. Richard-
Non.18
Gomez is a case involving support statutes in Texas which fail to re-
cognize any enforceable duty on the part of the biological father to sup-
port his illegitimate children while providing that the natural father has
a continuing and primary duty to support his legitimate children. The
Court invalidated the statute following Levy and Weber, which cases
the opinion declares to stand for the proposition that a state may not
invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them
substantial benefits accorded children generally.' 9 New Jersey Wel-
14. ". . That decision reflected, in major part, the traditional deference to a State's
prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders. The
Court has long afforded broad scope to state discretion in this action. Yet the substan-
tial state interest in providing for 'the stability of ... land titles and in the prompt and
definite determination of the valid ownership of property left by decedents,' Labine v.
Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 1969), is absent in the case at hand." Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. at 170. Query whether prospective application
of a court decision or a statutory scheme which affirmatively fixes vested rights at a
certain point in time might not satisfy the state's interest in these areas. See text at
note 46, infra.
15. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
16. 411 U.S. 535 (1973). New Jersey's Assistance to Families of the Working Poor
program, under attack in this case, is wholly financed by the State of New Jersey.
North Carolina has no comparable program. Its AFDC program is, of course, financed
jointly by the State and Federal governments under the Social Security Act.
17. 423 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), afj'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
18. 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
19. ". . . [O]nce a state posits a judicially enforceable right, on behalf of children,
to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justifi-
cation for denying such an essential right to a child simply because her natural father
has not married her mother. For a state to do so is 'illogical and unjust.' Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)." Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 538.
But cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 411 U.S. 614 (1973), where a five-to-four majority
of the court affirmed a three-judge district court decision to dismiss the action because
the appellant lacked standing. In that case the appellant, the mother of an illegitimate
child, sought to enjoin the local district attorney from refraining to prosecute the father
of her child under Art. 602 of the Texas Penal Code, which article makes it a misde-
meanor for a parent to fail to support his or her children. Through judicial construction
this provision was only applied in cases where the child was the legitimate child of the
father. The court held that the appellant had made no showing that her failure to secure
support payments resulted from the nonenforcement, as to her child's father, of Art. 602.
Whether 'basing its decision on "standing" amounted to an adjudication on the merits
is a question beyond the scope of this comment. However, the court did point out that
the decision in this case came close on the heels of the decision in Gomez, which deci-
sion would no doubt result in a restructuring of Texas' civil support statutes. Linda R.S.
then would presumably be able to rely on civil remedies to secure support from her
child's father.
4
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fare Rights Organization v. Cahill involved a challenge to New Jersey's
"Assistance to Families of the Working Poor" program, which was
alleged to discriminate against illegitimate children by limiting benefits
to only those otherwise qualified families "which consist of a household
composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to
each other who have at least one minor child of both; the natural child
of one and adopted by the other; or a child adopted by both." The
court held that the limitation imposed by the definition of eligible fam-
ilies was unconstitutional because violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court was "compelled" to reach this decision by its de-
cisions in Levy, Weber, and Gomez.
Finally in Davis v. Richardson and Griffin v. Richardson, the Court
was faced with alleged discrimination against illegitimate children in
the Social Security Act.2" This act is, of course, a federal act and as such
reliance on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was impossible. The district court had little trouble finding an invidious
discrimination against illegitimate children, however, and based its deci-
sion to enjoin enforcement of the questionable provision on cases hold-
ing that equal protection standards are "included" in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 21
Again, the actual basis which the Court used is vague. It seems safe
to say though, that federal laws which discriminate against illegitimate
children will be struck down, at least where their enforcement is in ap-
parent conflict with the purpose for which they were enacted.2 2  As
to state laws, the same conclusion cannot be reached! The Supreme
Court has made significant progress in equating the rights of illegiti-
mate children with their legitimate counterparts. Presumably this has
been done by making legal classifications of children on the basis of
legitimacy suspect, thus warranting special judicial consideration. La-
bine v. Vincent, however, shows that a "substantial" state interest may
prove sufficient to satisfy this special scrutiny by the courts. For this
and other reasons then, resort to the courts is an inadequate means for
accomplishing the goal of securing equality for illegitimate children.
20. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3), includes within the class of eligible
children those illegitimate children who are acknowledged or supported by the wage-
earner. However, in effect 42 U.S.C. § 403 (a) of the Act subject one sub-group of indi-
viduals who qualify as "children" under the Act (acknowledged and dependent illegiti-
mate children) to total deprivation unless all others who "deserve" payment receive their
full statutory share. And among the class of children who qualify under § 416(h)(3),
critical differences in the amount of money received occur based on the fortuitous factor
of the number of legitimate children the wage-earner had. See Davis v. Richardson, 342
F. Supp. at 591.
21. Richardson v. Becker, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
22. See e.g., Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588.
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The ultimate solution, and probably the one most consistent with the
historical and constitutional premise that the making and enforcing of
state laws is a function of the state legislatures (with particular Congres-
sional and court deference in the areas of economic and social policy),
would be wholesale revision of state laws which presently discriminate
against illegitimate children. This solution, of course, poses many
extremely difficult problems. A method that would accomplish sub-
stantially the same results, with fewer legal and social obstacles, would
be the adoption by each state of a Uniform Legitimacy Act. Such an
act could provide for easy legitimation proceedings, which in most cases
would not be proceedings at all, but would be the creation of rebuttable
presumptions *of legitimacy i.e., paternity. In the conclusion of this
comment Professor Harry D. Krause's "discussion draft" of the Uniform
Legitimacy Act submitted to the Committee on a Uniform Legitimacy
Act of the National Conference of Commissioners in Uniform State
Laws, will be briefly discussed. The following subsection, however, is
concerned with the rights of the illegitimate child in North Carolina.
THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN NORTH CAROLINA
Initially, it is important to note that North Carolina does not have
an integrated body of law dealing with the legal problems of the illegit-
imate. Neither has the legislature devised a scheme whereby illegit-
imate children may be deemed "children" of their natural parents and
thereby entitled to rights and benefits afforded children generally.
Recently, however, there have been significant changes made in some
of the more important areas23 of the law that indicate to this writer that
North Carolina may be in the forefront of states which have recognized
that the illegitimate child needs legal help."4 The actual motive for
enactment of the new laws is, of course, subject to speculation. In
some areas, the language of the statutes leads one to the inevitable con-
clusion that the interest that the state is trying to protect is its own
pocketbook and that benefiting the child is ancillary. Legislative mo-
23. For example, recent statutes in the areas of intestate succession and workmen's
compensation afford at least the acknowledged illegitimate with rights equal to his or
her legitimate counterpart. These areas will be discussed in detail in the text infra.
24. Minnesota is often regarded as a front-runner in this area, primarily due to its
statute conferring a duty on the commissioner of public welfare to take care that the
interests of the child are safeguarded. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1959). However,
North Carolina, which does not provide for the conference of such a general duty to
its Social Services Commission (See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143B-153 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-1 et seq. (1966).), does have more liberal laws in the
area of intestate succession. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (Supp. 1967),
wherein it is said that the illegitimate child inherits from its mother (but not her kin)
and its father (but not his kin), if the latter acknowledged the child in writing, with
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (Supp. 1974), which provides that an acknowledged illegiti-
mate child may inherit by, through and from its mother and acknowledging father.
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THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
ives, however, are always a subject of controversy and, in the case of
the illegitimate child who will benefit from the statutory changes, irrele-
vant. What is important is that progress is being made in this long
overlooked area. In as much as the law in this country has become,
in recent years, a vanguard of social welfare and historically has been
a significant factor in shaping social policy,2" a fair share of the respon-
sibility for putting an end to the immoral practice of legally stigmatizing
illegitimate children-the innocents of their parents' "wrong," must fall
on our state legislature and to a lesser extent on the courts.
Common Law
North Carolina follows the very strong common law presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.26 Now, after a long history
of court decisions, this presumption provides the child born of a married
woman an impressive arsenal of law to do battle with the social forces
that would rob him or her of the legal benefits that legitimate children
take for granted, albeit "unbeknownst" to them in most situations. No
attempt will be made to trace the complete history of the common law
in this area-a brief composite of some of the case holdings will suffice
to show the scope of the remedies it provides.
It is not relevant to the issue of legitimacy that the child was con-
ceived prior to the marriage of its parents. The child is, in law, legiti-
mate if born within matrimony, though born a day after the marriage. 27
25. See e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (right to racially
integrated education system); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1965) (right of private citizens to intervene
in the federal agency decision-making process in order to better protect the environ-
ment). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000e-
2000e-15 (outlawing racial discrimination in employment). Compare this phenomenon
with that existing in the Scandinavian countries, which have long granted substantially
equal rights to the illegitimate, principally because of the social practice of the people
generally in those countries. See generally, Christensen, Cultural Relativism and Pre-
marital Sex Norms, THE UNWED MOTHER 61-77 (R. Roberts ed. 1966), comparing
norms in Utah, Indiana and Denmark.
26. The presumption that children born while their mother was living in lawful wed-
lock with her husband are lcgitimate is conclusive in the absence of proof of impotency
of the husband, or evidence negativing the possibility or probability of access. State v.
Pettaway, 10 N.C. 623 (1825). In this regard it is important to note what the courts
will require as proof of marriage. In all civil cases except actions for criminal conver-
sation, and, in all criminal cases except prosecutions for bigamy, evidence of reputation
of marriage and cohabitation is sufficient to support a finding of the existence of a mar-
riage. Jackson v. Rhem, 59 N.C. 141 (1860); Felts v. Foster, 1 N.C. 164 (1799). Al-
though no case could be found to the contrary, this author has some doubt concerning
the vitality of this principle, particularly with respect to persons married within the
United States.
27. Rhyne v. Hoffman, 59 N.C. 335 (1862). Many of the old common law princi-
ples have now been codified in the statutory law of North Carolina. On the holding
in Rhyne v. Hoffman, supra, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-50(c) (1969), wherein it is
said: "If the mother was married either at the time of conception or birth, the name
213
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The presumption here is strong, but not conclusive.2 8  To overcome
the presumption it is necessary for one challenging the child's legiti-
macy to "plainly prove" the impossibility or improbability that the
husband was the father.29 Generally, as stated earlier, such proof must
be of impotency or of non-access by the husband.
Conversely, the child is presumed the legitimate offspring of the hus-
band of the mother when conception occurs during the! marriage of the
husband and mother, notwithstanding the fact that the child is born
after termination of the marriage."0 The same is true in cases where
the husband of the mother dies before the birth of the child. And
here, the law further presumes that any child born within ten lunar
months after the death of the husband is the lawful offspring of the
then deceased husband.3 Furthermore, where conception occurs dur-
ing the marriage of the mother, the courts will go out of their way to
provide the law's protection to the child. For example, if it is shown
that the husband was living in the same house with the mother during
the period in which the child was conceived, the legitimacy of the child
is conclusively presumed when the husband is not impotent.3 2 Simi-
larly, when there was in-fact access by the husband during the period
when the child was begotten, the child is presumed legitimate, notwith-
standing the fact that the mother was at the same time carrying on
"criminal intimacy" with others. 3
However, the common law imposed heavy burdens on the child born
out of wedlock who could not call into play the above presumptions.
For example, the child could not use the name of his or her father (a
signficant factor in a system of laws which has a primogeniture basis)
and, the child was not entitled to support from his or her father. 34
North Carolina has made significant "dents" in this wall to common law
condemnation of the illegitimate child, however, in many areas the
of the husband shall be entered on the [birth] certificate as the father of the child and
the surname of the child shall be the same as that of the husband, unless paternity has
been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, in which case the name
of the father as determined by the court shall be entered and the surname of the child
shall be the same as that of the mother."
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-50(c) (1969).
29. See Ewell v. Ewell, 163 N.C. 233, 79 S.E. 509 (1913).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (1966). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-50(c)
(1969); State v. Bowman, 230 N.C. 203, 52 S.E.2d 345 (1949).
31. See generally Byerly v. Talbert, 250 N.C. 27, 108 S.E.2d 29 (1959).
32. Evidence tending only to show that sexual intercourse between husband and wife
did not take place is insufficient for a finding that the husband was not the father of
the child of the wife, if access was possible. State v. Green, 210 N.C. 162, 185 S.E.
670 (1936); see also State v. Hickman, 8 N.C. App. 583, 174 S.E.2d 609, cert. denied,
277 N.C. 115 (1970).
33. Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224 (1941).
34. See generally Love v. Love, 179 N.C. 115, 101 S.E. 562 (1919) and cases cited
therein.
8
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spirit of the doctrine remains."
Statutory Provisions Establishing Paternity
In the spirit of the common law presumptions of legitimacy discussed
above, North Carolina has a number of statutory aids to the legally
"malconceived" child. When the mother of a child born out of wedlock
marries the putative father of that child, the child is legally deemed
to be legitimate for all purposes under the law (including but not
limited to entitlement to succession, inheritance, etc., by, through, and
from his or her father).16  Under this statute the ordinary procedure
of establishing proof of paternity is dispensed with in that if the child
is "regarded," "deemed," or "held in thought" by the parents them-
selves as their child, such child is legitimate.3" If the marriage of the
parents of a child is voidable or bigamous under North Carolina law,
the child is deemed legitimate, notwithstanding the annulment of the
marriage. 8  These statutes are simple curative remedies with respect
to the legitimation of the child and represent to this author's mind the
type of "presumptive" legislative action which most conforms with the
intent of the proposed Uniform Act which will be discussed infra.
Clearly the child benefits in that the stigma of bastardy is either
removed or never attaches. However, like the provisions for legitima-
tion by petition to the court by the putative father 39 and adoption by
the putative father,4" the provision for legitimation as the result of a
subsequent marriage of the child's parents suffers the infirmity of
requiring action by the parents of the child. Thus the child is power-
less to avoid the social and legal consequences of illegitimacy when his
or her parents refuse to act.
North Carolina does have one remedy for the illegitimate which does
not necessarily rely on action by the parents. Under recently enacted
Article 3 of Chapter 49 of the General Statutes,4 the child may insti-
tute civil proceedings to establish paternity. Establishment of paternity
results in the mother and the father each having the same rights and
obligations concerning custody and support as though their child were
35. Birth certificates still evidence the child's status in that they do not show the
father's name without his written consent under oath. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-54
(1974). Statutes still use language such as "next of kin," which by court decision, has
been construed not to include illegitimate children. See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-37
(1972), dealing with the distribution of workmen's compensation benefits in the event
of the death of an employee.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-12 (1966).
37. Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 617, 61 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1956).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11.1 (1966).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10 (Supp. 1971).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (1966).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-14-16 (Supp. 1974).
215
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legitimate. More effective enforcement of the right to support can be
expected under the statutes protecting legitimate children, which thus
become applicable.42 Proof of willful neglect or refusal to support a
child are aided by presumptions. 43  Thus prosecution is less of a
burden than under the bastardy section where proof of intent can be
difficult." This statutory scheme is no doubt designed to help relieve
the financial burden that the state often is forced to assume with respect
to illegitimate children and, as such it fails to remove the legal stigma
of illegitimacy. Although, as will be shown infra, the fact of legitimacy
is determinative of some benefits afforded children under North Carol-
ina law, the number of such distinctions is dwindling, with more and
more emphasis being placed on the question of paternity, regardless
of the marital status of the parents.
Intestate Succession
The U.S. Supreme Court has, for the present, elected to defer to the
state legislatures in the area of descent and distribution.4 5  Presumably
there is concern in this area about the stability of property and estate
laws and the effect that a court decision might have on vested rights.46
Until recently and since 1959, the illegitimate child in North Carolina
has been treated as though he or she were the legitimate child of his
or her mother for intestate succession purposes. 47  The child could not
inherit from its father or the father's relatives.48 On the other hand,
a legitimated child had the same rights to inherit by, through, and from
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (1969) provides: ". . . [I]f any father or mother
shall wilfully neglect or refuse to provide adequate support for his or her child or chil-
dren, whether natural or adopted, . . . [he or she] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
This section, however, has no application to illegitimate children. State v. Gardner, 219
N.C. 331, 13 S.E.2d 529 (1941). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 presumably overrules this
court decision, in so far as the illegitimate child whose paternity is established pursuant
to § 49-14.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-323 (1966).
44. See e.g., State v. Day, 232 N.C. 388, 61 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
45. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532.
46. Blackstone's view has it that the legal effect of a court decision which "makes
new law" is that the "new law" is merely a clarification of, or correction of a prior appli-
cation of "the" law, and as such all court decisions have retroactive effect. See 1 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (2d ed. 1766). Retroactive application of a U.S. Supreme
Court decision in the area of intestate succession would no doubt be the "proximate
cause" of mass suicide by title insurance underwriters and estate planners everywhere.
The notion that judges do not have the power to make their decisions prospective only,
however, has 'been challenged by legal scholars and members of the judiciary so fre-
quently that the question whether to make a decision prospective or retroactive has be-
come one based on the policy factors to be weighed in each case. See generally Chaffee,
Do fudges Make or Discover Law?, 91 PROc. AM. PHILos. Soc'Y 405 (1947).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1966).
48. Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S,E.2d 592 (1964).
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its father and mother as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock.49
The 1973 General Assembly, however, made a significant change in
the law in this area. Any child born an illegitimate child who is
legitimated in accordance with North Carolina law or in accordance
with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction is still entitled, by suc-
cession, to property by, through, and from its father and mother the
same as if born in lawful wedlock.50 With respect to the child not
formally legitimated, the 1973 amendment to the statutes permits the
child to take not only by, through, and from its mother but also by,
through, and from (1) any person who has been judicially determined
to be the father of the child pursuant to civil proceedings to establish
paternity;5 (2) any person who has formally acknowledged himself
during his own lifetime to be the father of such child.52  This same
statute also provides that any person who acknowledges himself to be
the father of an illegitimate child in his duly probated last will shall
be deemed to have intended that the child be treated as expressly pro-
vided for in the will or, in the absence of any express provision, the
same as a legitimate child.55
This new statutory scheme is a vast improvement over that which
previously existed with respect to the rights of children born out of wed-
lock. Legitimation is no longer required before the child can take from
its father, and the child itself may now initiate a civil action to establsih
paternity. In the latter situation, however, the burden still realistically
lies on the parents of the child to establish its paternity because the
action to establish paternity must be commenced within three years
after the birth of the child or within three years after the date of the
last payment by the putative father for support of the child. 54  And,
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-18 (1966). See-also Greenlee v. Quinn, 255 N.C. 601,
122 S.E.2d 409 (1961). A child adopted in accordance with North Carolina law or
the applicable law of any other jurisdiction is also entitled to inherit through and from
its adoptive parents and their heirs the same as if it were the natural legitimate child
of the adoptive parents. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17 (1966).
50. See note 49 supra.
51. Discussed supra in text accompanying note 41.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (Supp. 1974). The acknowledgment required by this
statute is a written instrument executed or acknowledged before a certifying officer (jus-
tice, judge, magistrate, clerk or assistant or deputy clerk of the court) and filed during
the lifetime of the person making the acknowledgment in the office of the clerk of su-
perior court.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(d). Note also that the subsequent entitlement of an
after-born illegitimate child to take as an heir pursuant to the provisions of § 29-19(b)
does not revoke the will of a testator, but any so entitled illegitimate child shall have
the right to share in the testator's estate to the same extent as an after-born or after-
adopted child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (Supp. 1974).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c) (Supp. 1974). The action may be brought by
the director of public welfare when the child is likely to become a public charge. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 49-16(2) (Supp. 1974). This remedy may also prove illusory because in
virtually all cases it depends on the mother of the child seeking public welfare within
11
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as at common law, the unacknowledged and unlegitimated child takes
nothing from its father under the laws of intestacy.
Wrongful Death
North Carolina has a wrongful death statute. It provides that when
the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act. . . of another such
as would, if the injured party had lived, have entitled him to an action
for damages, therefor, the action may be brought by the personal
representation of the decedent. The statute further provides that the
amount recovered in such action shall be disposed of as provided in
the Intestate Succession Act.55
With respect to an illegitimate child recovering for the death of its
mother (Levy v. Louisiana) and a mother recovering for the death of
her illegitimate child (Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co.), North Carolina's intestate succession laws comply with
the equal protection mandate of the Constitution. The illegitimate
child is treated as if it were the legitimate child of its mother, 56 and
would thus stand in the same place legally as its legitimate counterpart.
Distribution of the estate of an illegitimate intestate who dies leaves
no surviving spouse and no surviving children generally follows ma-
ternal lines of kinship. 57  The mother of such a child, who would be
otherwise eligible, would therefore take whether the intestate was legit-
imate or illegitimate.
To this author's mind, however, there is a serious question as to the
constitutionality of this method of distribution with respect to the ille-
gitimate child's right to receive wrongful death proceeds resulting from
the death of the child's father. Many of the infirmities of the statutory
method of distributing the proceeds have been cured by the 1973
amendment to the intestate succession laws discussed supra. But, what
of the illegitimate child who has not been formally acknowledged and
whose paternity has not been established before the untimely death of
its father?" It doesn't take much imagination to conceive of the "test"
the time periods set out in § 49-14(c). And, although the statute provides that the di-
rector may bring the action, no statutory duty is actually proscribed.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966). "While any sum recovered is not a part
of decedent's estate, such sum can only be recovered in the name of the personal repre-
sentative, and must be distributed under laws of intestacy in this State." Harrison v.
Carter, 226 N.C. 36, 36 S.E.2d 700 (1946) citing Neill v. Wilson, 146 N.C. 242, 59
S.E. 674 (1907). Note that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2, effective July 1, 1975, does
not change the distributive aspects of the wrongful death statute.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (Supp. 1974).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-20-22 (1966).
58. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c) wherein it is said: "Provided, that no such
action [to establish paternity] shall be commenced nor judgment entered after the death
of the putative father,"
12
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case. A man and woman living together, not married, give birth to
a child acknowledged both privately and publicly by the man to be his
child. Unless the father formally acknowledges the child, which, of
course, presupposes his knowledge of the necessity of such action, the
child would receive nothing from a distribution of wrongful death pro-
ceeds. The illegitimate child's legitimate counterpart, would take as
much as all of the proceeds of the wrongful death action.59
North Carolina would be hard pressed to substantiate this distribution
scheme in the face of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Levy and
Weber. Certainly, the purpose of the wrongful death statute is not pro-
moted by this statutory classification, nor, to this author's mind, is there
any rational relationship between allowing recovery for wrongful death
and denying distribution to the formally unacknowledged illegitimate
child.60
Workmen's Compensation
In case of death of an employee entitled to compensation under
North Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act,6' there is basically a
three-prong scheme for payment of the award:
(1) to persons wholly dependent for support upon the earnings of
the deceased employee, to the exclusion of all others;
(2) if there is no person wholly dependent for support, to persons
partially dependent;
(3) if there is no person partially dependent for support, to the em-
ployee's next of kin.12
The Act also provides that a widow, widower and all children of the
deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent for support upon the deceased employee.6 3
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-13-15 (1966). Distribution of wrongful death pro-
ceeds via North Carolina's intestate succession laws also raises equal protection questions
with respect to the subgroups established therein. That is, different classes of illegiti-
mate children receive different treatment under this method of distribution. Analysis
of this problem adds nothing to the substance of this comment and will therefore not
be made. The reform-minded legislator or the practicing attorney should be mindful,
however, of this aspect of the illegitimate child problem. See generally Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). For an actual situation, see Byerly v.
Tolbert, 250 N.C. 27, 108 S.E.2d 29 (1959), wherein the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the trial court for a determination of the paternity of a child of a woman whose
husband's death resulted in a wrongful death settlement. The child was born more than
280 days after the death of the husband of its mother and as such, had to overcome
the presumption of illegitimacy before being entitled to a share of the settlement.
60. Nor is there the type of special "property-type" considerations in the wrongful
death situation which caused the U.S. Supreme Court to pause momentarily in Labine
in its movement to judicially eradicate the legal stigma of illegitimacy.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 et seq. (1972).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1972). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-37 (1972).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-39 (1972).
219
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The courts of North Carolina have construed these statutes to stand
for the proposition that dependency will be conclusively presumed
where the law imposes a duty of support.64 Early in the case law
development in this area, informally acknowledged illegitimate children
were included in the statutory definition of "child" and, as such were
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the
deceased employee, notwithstanding the fact that the "duty" of support
in such situations then could be more correctly characterized as a
"moral" one rather than one imposed by law.65 In 1955 in the case
of Wilson v. Utah Construction Co.,66 the court had the opportunity to
provide illegitimate children generally with the same rights as legiti-
mate children under the Act. It declined to do so, however, citing
"acknowledgment" as the key to entitlement and holding that without
sufficient evidence tending to show that the child was acknowledged
it was not entitled to compensation.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., at first blush, would seem to vitiate the North Carolina posi-
tion in this area as expressed in Wilson. However, factually Weber
and Wilson are distinguishable. In Weber, the unacknowledged illegit-
imate child denied compensation by the Louisiana workmen's compen-
sation laws was shown to be actually dependent on the deceased
employee. Since the purpose of death benefits in workmen's compen-
sation awards is to provide support for the dependents of the deceased
employee, the court had no trouble finding that Louisiana's denial of
benefits to the dependent unacknowledged illegitimate child bore no
rational reiationship to the purpose of the workmen's compensation act.
Since those conclusively presumed to be dependent on the deceased
employee prior to his death (a classification which under Wilson does
not include the unacknowledged illegitimate), do not take exclusive of
other persons wholly dependent on the deceased employee, 67 the North
Carolina courts could arguably comply with the literal holding of Weber
in a case where the unacknowledged illegitimate was shown to be
64. See Wilson v. Utah Construction Co., 243 N.C. 96, 89 S.E.2d 864 (1955).
65. See Lippard v. Southeastern Express Co., 207 N.C. 507, 177 S.E. 801 (1935).
The deceased supported a housekeeper who bore him a posthumous illegitimate child.
The Industrial Commission found as a fact that the deceased had made it known that
he was the father of the child. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's decision
that the child was not a dependent. It stated that the "dependency which the statute
recognizes as a basis of the right of the child to compensation grows out of the relation-
ship which in itself imposes upon the father the duty to support the child, and confers
upon the child the right to support by its father. The status of the child, social or legal,
is immaterial." See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12) (1972). "Child . . . shall include
. . . [an] acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased."
66. 243 N.C. 96, 89 S.E.2d 864 (1955).
67. See Shealy v. Associated Transport Co., 252 N.C. 738, 114 S.E.2d 702 (1960).
See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-39 (1972).
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actually dependent on the deceased employee. 8
What of the unacknowledged illegitimate child born after the death
of the entitled employee or "unknown" to the employee before his
death? Is he or she to be denied benefits---even though it could be
argued that the employee would have supported the child, indeed been
legally compelled to do so, had it been born before the employee's
death or had its existence become known to the employee before his
death?
The test used in Weber is certainly broad enough to include all ille-
gitimate children of the deceased employee within the definition of
"child" in North Carolina's workmen's compensation statutes. It is this
author's view that Weber mandates such a result with the only issue
left to the Industrial Commission and the courts that of establishing pa-
ternity.
Support-Private and Public
Both parents have a statutory duty in North Carolina to support their
illegitimate children. 9 The mother's duty to support the child may be
enforced at any time before the child reaches the age of eighteen.
Except where paternity is established by civil action,70 however, in most
cases the father must be prosecuted for non-support within three years
of birth of the child.7
With one notable exception,7" the Bastardy Support Statutes provide
the only means by which the illegitimate child can secure support from
68. But cf. Fields v. Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 78 S.E.2d 740 (1953). The court
refused to allow benefits to a woman who had been "cohabiting" with the deceased be-
fore his death, although it conceded that she had been wholly dependent on him.
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (1966). See also Dellinger v. Bollinger, 242 N.C.
696, 89 S.E.2d 592 (1955), wherein the court states that this statute recognizes that the
putative father of an illegitimate child is now deemed to be the father thereof within
the eyes of the law.
70. The effect and mechanics of establishing paternity by civil action are set out
in the text corresponding to note 41 supra, and will not be commented on here except
to again note that this remedy provides substantial protection for the illegitimate child
able to take advantage of it.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-4 (1966). A three-prong time period is established for
prosecution of the putative father:
(1) within three years next after the birth of the child or;
(2) where the.paternity of the child has been judicially determined within three years
after its birth, at any time before the child attains the age of eighteen years or;
(3) where the reputed father has acknowledged paternity of the child by payments
for the support thereof within three years next after the birth of such child, three years
from the date of the last payment whether such last payment was made within three
years of the birth of such child or thereafter. Provided, the action is instituted before
the child attains the age of eighteen years.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-326 (1969). "If any mother shall willfully abandon her
child or children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, and under sixteen years of age, she
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.)
15
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its parents.'3 The legitimate child, on the other hand, may rely on the
common law duty of support imposed on its parents, and the criminal
law statutes under which proof of neglect is aided by presumptions. 74
This "package" of inequities imposed on the illegitimate child is com-
pounded by the following: the bastardy nonsupport statute is criminal
in nature and therefore the burden of proof is "beyond a reasonable
doubt; ' 75 willful neglect or willful failure to support the child must be
shown;78 and blood-group tests which are admissible if they tend to ex-
clude the possibility of paternity, are inadmissible to show the possibil-
ity or probability of paternity.77
Clearly, the burden imposed on the legitimate child's enforcing its
right to support is a "featherweight" when compared with the burden
imposed on the illegitimate child. North Carolina does provide for
support of illegitimate children and therefore would not be controlled
by the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Gomez v. Perez. Texas
law made no provision for support of the child by the natural father
of the child. However the policy set down by the court language in
that case indicates a broader application and it would seem to this writer
that North Carolina law in this area, although arguably not in derelega-
tion of the Supreme Court, does not comply with the spirit of the new
standard.78
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (1969), provides that "if any father or mother shall
willfully neglect or refuse to provide adequate support for his or her child or children,
whether natural or adopted . . . . he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This
statute, however, has been held to have no application to illegitimate children. State
v. Gardner, 219 N.C. 331, 13 S.E.2d 529 (1941). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-325 (1969),
provides that "if any husband, while living with his wife, shall willfully neglect to pro-
vide adequate support of such wife or the children which he has begotten upon her ... ,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This statute, by definition, does not apply to il-
legitimate children.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-323 (1969).
75. State v. Moore, 238 N.C. 743, 78 S.E.2d 914 (1953).
76. See State v. McDay, 232 N.C. 388, 61 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
77. Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972). See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 49-7 (1966). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1969).
78. The policy, as set out by the court in Gomez, is essentially that once a State
posits a judicially enforceable right, on behalf of children, to needed support from their
natural fathers, there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has _not married its mother.
To do so is an invidious discrimination. The State, of course, does have a compelling
duty to protect the rights of the man alleged to be the father of the child. His property
and liberty may be at stake. However, establishment of paternity does not necessarily
mean establishment of willful neglect and it is only proof of the latter fact which can
result in a loss of liberty. Since in civil actions generally, property rights are every day
determined on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
proof, the question raised here is why must paternity be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt? Further, why are 'blood tests not admissible to show probability of paternity?
Further still, why are the civil and criminal actions to establish paternity so severely
limited in time? See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-4, 14-16 (Supp. 1974). Is reform not
needed?
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The support statutes just discussed help serve another purpose
though in that in addition to providing criminal sanctions against the
non-supporting parent, they also serve to establish, judicially, the
paternity of the child.79 This has particular significance in the area of
public support, embodied in North Carolina's Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program."0
Where paternity is established, illegitimate children are eligible for
AFDC on an equal footing with legitimate children. 8 ' In some cases,
the non-marriage of the parents of the child is a "benefit" to the child
in the sense that deprivation of parental support and care (thus eligi-
bility for AFDC) is conclusively presumed when the child's parents are
not married to each other and paternity has not been judicially
established." It is interesting to note that when this situation arises,
the county social services department is impressed by regulation, with
a duty for establishing paternity for the child. s
There is one hypothetical case, however, where equivalent benefits
will not accrue to the illegitimate where they would accrue to his or
her legitimate counterpart. If the mother is the "absent" parent and
the putative father lives with the child, the child may be denied eligi-
bility if the child was born illegitimate; paternity has never been estab-
lished by the courts; the father has never legitimated the child by
79. State v. Collins, 85 N.C. 511 (1881).
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-23-39.1 (Supp. 1974).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-38(a) (Supp. 1974). "Assistance shall be granted to
any dependent child who:
(2) Has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of a parent's death,
physical or mental incapacity, or continued absence from the home of one or both
parents." Although the language of the statute makes no mention of legitimacy of the
child, the North Carolina Department of Human Resources AFDC manual provides that
only those persons with a legal duty of support are to be considered in determining the
eligibility of the child. These persons are:
1. the natural mother, and
2. the natural father, if
a. married to the mother, or
b. paternity was established through the courts, or
c. the man legitimated the child by petition to the court or subsequent marriage
to the mother; or
3. adoptive parents after the final order of adoption is issued.
See N.C. DEP'T OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Div. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, AFDC MANUAL §
2330-1 (Rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AFDC MANUAL]. Keying deprivation of
parental support or care to persons with a legal duty of support is a relatively recent
innovation. Before King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), children otherwise eligible for
AFDC benefits were denied assistance in many states (including North Carolina) if
their mother maintained a continuing sexual relationship with a man. This "substitute
father" or 'man in the house" rule was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as being
inconsistent with the Social Security Act. See generally Note, 47 N.C.L. REv. 228
(1968).
82. AFDC MANUAL § 2330-I,C,7.
83. Id.
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petition to the court or subsequent marriage to the mother; or, the
father has not adopted the childYs4 This hypothetical situation is, no
doubt, rarely encountered by the county social service departments
and may be cured by the institution of a paternity action by the depart-
ment. It is presumed that the intention here is to force the putatitive
father to legally establish his duty to support the child and to the extent
this result is accomplished, the child will benefit. However, the child
would be eligible for benefits even though the father did not have a
legal duty because of the absence of its mother. The proceedings
necessary to establish paternity could still be brought by the depart-
ment, if the father was not willing to take the necessary steps himself,
and the child would, in the meantime, receive benefits according to the
very purpose of the AFDC program.
CONCLUSION
The law cannot remove the social prejudice against the illegitimate
child. However, a comprehensive legislative plan which would remove
the legal prejudice is within the power of the state legislature. Remov-
ing the legal stigma could very well be the beginning of a relaxation
of the social stigma. It would also, of course, result in benefits flowing
to the child which we all have come to expect as citizens of this country.
To this writer's mind, the constitutional mandate of equality for the
illegitimate child has not been met.85  Although some progress has
been made by the General Assembly, its task is not complete. Reform
is essential and the concentration of legislative effort should come in
the public law.
It is proposed that North Carolina proceed with a three-prong attack
to establish equality.
First, an "equality" statute should be enacted which would declare the
State's policy. An excellent example enacted by North Dakota, in the
wake of Levy v. Louisiana, is:
Every child is hereby declared to be the legitimate child of its natural
parents, and is entitled to support and education, to the same extent
as if he [or she] had been born in lawful wedlock. He [or she] shall
inherit from his [or her] natural parents, and from their kindred heir,
lineal and collateral.8 6
84. Interview with Elaine Jenkins, caseworker, Durham County Department of So-
cial Services, in Durham, N.C., Feb. 1, 1975. This result seems, to this writer, com-
pletely contrary to the regulations promulgated by the Department of Human Resources
in its AFDC manual. Clearly the child is deprived of parental support and care due
to the continued absence from the home of both parents in that deprivation of support
is based on a legal duty, which is not imposed on the hypothetical putative father set
out in the text.
85. See particularly the discussion of workmen's compensation and wrongful death.
86. N.D. CENT. COnE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1969), cited in KRAUSE at 235.
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Second, a statute establishing a duty on the part of county social service
directors to take care that the interests of the illegitimate child are safe-
guarded.8 7  It is also imperative that this duty be legally enforceable
and enforced! Minnesota has such a statute which could serve as a
model. It reads as follows:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public welfare when noti-
fied of a woman who is delivered of an illegitimate child, or pregnant
with child likely to be illegitimate when born, to take care that the in-
terests of the child are safeguarded, that appropriate steps are taken
to establish his [or her] paternity, and that there is secured for him
[or her] the nearest possible approximation to the care, support,
and education that he [or her] would be entitled to if born of lawful
marriage. For the better accomplishment of these purposes the com-
missioner of public welfare may initiate such legal or other action as
is deemed necessary; may make such provision for the care, mainte-
nance, and education of the child as the best interests of the child may
from time to time require, and may offer his aid and protection in such
ways as are found wise and expedient to the unmarried woman ap-
proaching motherhood. a8
Third, affirmative action is needed to establish the parents of the child,
for it is by, through and from them that all private and many public
benefits flow to the child. It is proposed that this be accomplished
through the enactment of a statute establishing the relationship of the
child to its mother by its birth to her and establishing the relationship
of the child to its father by a number of means, all of which would be
aided by presumptions. These presumptions would be disputable only
by a presumed father or the mother of the child or the child itself,
and only if they act without delay. The burden of overcoming the pre-
sumptions, would fall on the person disputing paternity."
87. North Carolina presently has an assortment of statutory provisions which,
through the establishment of paternity, aid the illegitimate child. They are, it seems
to this writer, insufficient to safeguard the child's interests. Clearly, the civil action to
establish paternity under G.S. § 49-14-16, almost always requires action by the parents,
whose interests are often in conflict with the child. Even permitting the director of pub-
lic welfare to bring the action, as the statute does, is insufficient because the director's
standing is limited to cases where the child is likely to become a public charge. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16(2). This grant of standing to the director is based on the
interest of the welfare department, not the interests of the child. In addition, there is
a statutory provision which permits the county director of social services to petition the
court for judicial protection for the illegitimate child under the general juvenile jurisdic-
tion of the courts. However, before the county director of social services is even noti-
fied of potential problems, the mother must have given birth to two previous illegitimate
children, which information filters "down" to the social services director through a
myriad of red tape. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-58.1 (1974).
88. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1959).
89. This statute could be patterned after Professor Harry D. Krause's Discussion
Draft of the UNIFORM LEGITIMACY ACT § 3. See KRAUSE at 241-42. The man would
be presumed to be the father of the child,
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All of the above proposals are contained, in somewhat different
form, in Professor Krause's proposed Uniform Legitimacy Act.9 °
Finally then, this author would advocate the adoption of such an act
by the North Carolina General Assembly, when approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
GEOFFREY E. GLEDHILL
Taylor v. Hil-AFDC Benefits for Unborn Children
"TWO WOMEN DEMAND AID FOR UNBORN" was a May 24,
1974 headline in the Charlotte Observer.' Two Charlotte, North
Carolina, women filed suit in the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, demanding financial aid for their unborn
children. This headline and the ultimate granting of a preliminary in-
junction by Judge McMillan in Taylor v. Hill,2 prompted an investiga-
tion into the basis upon which these and other claims throughout the
United States have been brought.
In Taylor, the pregnant mothers' action challenged the North Caro-
l. if he and the child's mother are or have been married and the child is born during
the marriage, or within 300 days after the termination of marital cohabitation by reason
of death, annulment, divorce, or separation ordered by a court; or
2. if, prior to the child's birth, he and the child's mother have attempted to marry,
and some form of marriage ceremony has been performed in apparent compliance with
law, though such attempted marriage is or might be declared void for any reason, and
the child is born during such attempted marriage or within 300 days after the termina-
tion of marital cohabitation by reason of death, annulment, divorce, or separation
ordered by the court; or
3. if, after the child's birth, he and the child's mother marry or attempt to marry,
and some form of marriage ceremony has been performed in apparent compliance with
law, though such attempted marriage is or might be declared void for any reason, and
(a) he has publicly acknowledged the child as his in writing filed with the clerk of court
in the county wherein the child resides, or (b) he is listcd as the child's father on the
child's birth certificate, or (c) he has previously become obligated to support the child
under the law of this State or under the laws of another jurisdiction; or
4. if he receives the child into his home and it lives with him and he publicly recog-
nizes the child as his, with the acquiescence of his wife if he is married, for a period
of [one year] without objection disputing his paternity filed [within three years] with
the clerk of court in the county wherein the child resides by the child's mother or an-
other man claiming to be the child's father or the county director of social services, or
5. upon an order of the court in an action which establishes him as the father of
the child.
90. See KRAUSE at 241-56.
I. The Charlotte Observer, May 24, 1974, § C, at 1, col. 4.
2. 377 F. Supp. 495 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (case noted in newspaper article).
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